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Evidence
by W. Randall Bassett*
Val Leppert**
and Harris K. Howard***
I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's 2017
term' included important precedential opinions on a number of evidence
topics. For example, in three published cases, the court again followed its
trend of deferring to trial courts on the use of expert testimony, affirming
all three in published opinions. 2 The court also considered the interplay
between a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an effective crossexamination and the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida's authority to limit the scope of cross-examination.3
The court offered few significant opinions regarding the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. However, in two
unpublished opinions the court considered the unique realities law
enforcement officers encounter while protecting the public. One case
considered pre-Miranda questioning during a traffic stop where the

*Partnerin the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. The Citadel (B.S., 1989);
University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1992).
-Senior Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Westminster
College (B.A. 2004); Mercer University, School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2010).
*Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Tulane University
(B.S., 2012); Tulane University (M.S., 2013); Mercer University, School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 2016).
1. For an analysis of evidence law during the prior survey period, see W. Randall
Bassett, Val Leppert & Stephen A. McCullers, Evidence, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 68
MERCER L. REV. 1019 (2017).
2. See Knight v. Miami-Dade Cty., 856 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2017); Bobo v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 855 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1328 (11th
Cir. 2017); see also Bassett et al., supra note 1, at 1029 (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's
trend of closely scrutinizing the exclusion of expert testimony).
3. United States v. Jeri, 869 F.3d 1247, 1254 (11th Cir. 2017).
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officer personally knew the suspect, 4 and the second case considered
whether a defendant's pre-Mirandastatement made after a high-stakes
arrest could be offered at sentencing. 5
The Eleventh Circuit also issued two published opinions addressing
the Federal Rules of Evidence's prohibition on character evidence. In one
case involving a defendant's prosecution for healthcare fraud, the
Eleventh Circuit held that evidence of prior communications with an
informant, which implicated violent behavior, were properly before the
jury.6 In another case, the court held that, under Rule 404(b), 7 evidence
of "structuring" deposits in a tax fraud case was properly admitted.8 This
Survey of the Eleventh Circuit's 2017 opinions on evidentiary issues
provides a concise summary of all of these rulings and provides the
practitioner with a succinct overview of the most important evidence
rulings.
II. EXPERT TESTIMONY
Federal courts assess the admissibility of expert opinion testimony
under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 9 Pursuant to that rule,
the proponent of the evidence bears the burden of showing that (1) the
expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters the
expert intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert
reaches the expert's conclusions is sufficiently reliable; and (3) the
testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific,
technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.' 0 Interpreting Rule 702 in the seminal case of

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,"the Supreme Court of the
United States emphasized that district courts must perform a
"gatekeeping" function before they can admit expert testimony. 12 Given
that an expert's opinion "can be both powerful and quite misleading
because of the difficulty in evaluating it,"13 district court judges must

4. United States v. Douglas, 688 F. App'x 658, 664 (11th Cir. 2017).
5. United States v. Jackson, No. 17-10302, U.S. App. LEXIS 23048, at *3-5 (11th Cir.
Nov. 16, 2017).
6. United States v. Nerey, 877 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 2017).
7. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
8. United States v. Horner, 853 F.3d 1201, 1213 (11th Cir. 2017).
9. FED. R. EVID. 702.
10. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc); City of
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998).
11. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
12. Id. at 589 n.7.
13. Id. at 595 (quotation marks omitted).
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"conduct an exacting analysis of the foundations of expert opinions" 14 to
ensure "that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional
studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level
of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field."1 5

In performing the Rule 702 gatekeeping function, district court judges
enjoy "considerable leeway," 16 which means that appellate courts apply
the abuse of discretion standard and can reverse only when the ruling is
"manifestly erroneous."1 7 As outlined in the 2016 Survey, the Eleventh
Circuit has generally applied this deferential standard of review,
affirming over seventy percent of all Daubert rulings since the beginning
of this decade. 18 It is worth noting that the court has affirmed every
ruling admitting expert evidence over a Daubert objection in the last
seven years.19 All six cases reversing a Daubert ruling since 2010
involved the lower court's exclusion of expert evidence. 20 In all six of those
cases, the lower courts had excluded a plaintiffs key expert testimony,
resulting in either a summary judgment 21 or a jury verdict for the
defendant. 22 The Eleventh Circuit's 2017 term saw few cases that hinged
entirely on expert testimony, however, the term was notable in that the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed all Daubert rulings in opinions that were
published. 23
In Knight v. Miami-Dade County,24 a victim of a police shooting and
the estate of a second victim brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 198325
against the police officers and detectives, a county, and its police
14. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260 (quotation marks omitted).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1258.
17. Id.
18. Bassett et al., supranote 1, at 1029.
19. One possible exception to this pattern was United States v. Harrell, where the
Eleventh Circuit found the district court abused its discretion in allowing a detective to
testify as an expert, but that the error was harmless. 751 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2014).
20. Seamon v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, 813 F.3d 983, 991 (11th Cir. 2016); Sorrels
v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 796 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2015); Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am.,
760 F.3d 1322, 1336 (11th Cir. 2014); United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 704 F.3d
1338, 1343 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ala. Power Co., 730 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir.
2013); Rosenfeld v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 654 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 2011).
21. Seamon, 813 F.3d at 991; Sorrels, 796 F.3d at 1279; Adams, 760 F.3d at 1336;
United Fire & Cas. Co., 704 F.3d at 1343; Ala. Power Co., 730 F.3d at 1288.
22. Rosenfeld, 654 F.3d at 1194.
23. The three affirmed rulings were Bobo, 855 F.3d at 1301; Knight, 856 F.3d at 802;
Williams, 865 F.3d at 1340.
24. 856 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2017).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
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department. The plaintiffs brought claims for alleged excessive use of
force, coercive interrogation, and assault and battery. On the night of
November 12, 2007, two police officers with the Miami-Dade Police
Department attempted to stop an SUV for purportedly running a red
light. The SUV did not stop, and instead, continued to drive several
blocks around the city, eventually stopping at a dead end. The police
pursued and parked their car behind the SUV, turned on their spotlight,
exited their vehicle, and ordered plaintiffs to exit the SUV. The two
officers then approached the vehicle, one from the driver's side, and the
other from the passenger's side. The accounts of the officers and lone
surviving victim varied drastically. According to the officers, after
approaching the vehicle, the driver rotated the steering wheel clockwise
and quickly reversed, forcing the officer on the driver's side to move to
avoid the SUV. In response to the vehicle moving, the officers began
shooting into the vehicle, killing the driver and front seat passenger, and
seriously wounding the remaining passenger in the back seat. The
surviving victim's recollection was distinct in that she recalled hearing a
"clink" followed by a shot aimed at the driver of the SUV before it
accelerated backwards. On remand, after an unpublished decision from
the Eleventh Circuit, the trial court made several rulings regarding the
admissibility of expert witness testimony that were the subject of
appeal. 26
The defendants' police-practices expert, W. Kenneth Katsaris, was
called upon to rebut the plaintiffs' police-practices expert. Katsaris
testified that the officers "acted reasonabl[y] and in accordance with what
is recognized as training throughout the country." 27 Both parties moved
to exclude the expert testimony entirely. 28 The district court denied both
motions, but placed limits on the scope of questions at trial. 29 In
particular, the court ruled that the "experts could not be questioned on
'the constitutionality of the Miami-Dade Police Department's policies' or
on 'any ballistics, bullet projectile, or accident reconstruction issues,' and
that they could not 'testify, reference, or analyze any case law before the
jury."' 30
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that there was "no
error (let alone a clear error of judgment) in permitting Katsaris to
testify."3 1 As to the plaintiffs' first challenge, that Katsaris's opinions

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Knight, 856 F.3d at 803-06.
Id. at 807.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 809.
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were not grounded in reliable principles and methods, the Eleventh
Circuit found that he adequately considered the evidence in the file,
statements from officers and those present, visited the scene of the crime
before giving his testimony, and reviewed how the incident occurred. 32
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that there was no abuse of discretion
concluding that the opinion was based on "sufficiently reliable and
grounded on sound principles and methods." 33 The plaintiffs also
contended on appeal that Katsaris's testimony was inadmissible because
he relied on hearsay statements to inform his opinion. 34 The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that "[t]his evidence is precisely the kind reasonably
relied on by experts in the field, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the expert's testimony." 35 The plaintiffs also
challenged Katsaris's consideration of testimony from the sole surviving
plaintiff regarding the deceased driver's refusal to put the SUV in park. 36
This informed Katsaris's opinion that the deceased driver deliberately
backed into the officers, which created a reasonable basis for the use of
deadly force.3 7 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the statements were
properly relied upon because these statements were used to corroborate
the defendants' statements, and that the plaintiffs had an opportunity to
challenge Katsaris's statements, and thus, affirmed the district court. 38
In another published opinion from the 2017 term, Bobo v. Tennessee
Valley Authority,39 the plaintiff brought an action against the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) and eight other defendants based upon her
exposure to asbestos. The plaintiff alleged that her eventual diagnosis
with mesothelioma was the result of cleaning her husband's clothing who
was an employee of the TVA from 1975-1997. The plaintiff brought
claims for, among other things, strict liability, premises liability,
negligence, breach of warranty, and conspiracy. During the proceedings,
the plaintiff passed away and the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama substituted her daughters as
representatives of her estate. The court dismissed several claims, but
allowed the case to proceed to trial on a claim of negligence. After a bench
trial, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on negligence

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 809.
Id.
Id. at 809-10.
855 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2017).
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grounds for nearly $3.4 million dollars. 40 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's acceptance of plaintiffs expert on the proximate cause
of the plaintiffs illness.

4

1

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the

defendants mischaracterized the expert's explanation of asbestos
exposure as concluding that "any exposure" could lead to mesothelioma
which conflicted with the expert's testimony that "significant exposures"
to asbestos led to the illness.

42

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district

court's conclusion that the expert's opinion was also based on an
"extensive knowledge of the facts in this case and was supported by
scientific literature."4 3 The Eleventh Circuit concluded by noting that
"[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Mark's
expert testimony, particularly given that the court, not a jury, was
serving as the factfinder.""
In United States v. Williams,45 the defendants were purportedly
conspiring to distribute unrecovered cocaine allegedly thrown from a
fishing boat before being boarded by the Coast Guard. In Williams, a
United States Coast Guard cutter, the BEAR, was patrolling for drug
smugglers near the coast of Colombia and Panama. Around midnight, the
BEAR detected the presence of a vessel on its radar heading away from
the coast of Panama. The Coast Guard pursued the vessel in a rigid hull
inflatable boat, and the vessel proceeded to take a suspect zig-zag path
while its occupants appeared to throw large bales with unknown contents
into the ocean. Coast Guard officers eventually boarded the vessel, a
thirty-four-foot fishing boat named the RASPUTIN, and noted, among
several abnormalities, the lack of fishing gear on the vessel. During the
pursuit, the RASPUTIN's occupants successfully jettisoned the bales into
the ocean. The officers proceeded to question the RASPUTIN's occupants
and took samples or "swipes" from the RASPUTIN's surfaces in order to
detect trace amounts of contraband. The swipes were then sent back to
the BEAR and tested using an IonScan machine. The results came back
positive for cocaine and the RASPUTIN's occupants were arrested for
several drug-related charges including possession with intent to
distribute cocaine. At trial, the government introduced testimony from
one of the Coast Guard officers who conducted the testing with the

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1297-1300.
Id. at 1301.
Id.
Id.

44. Id.
45. 865 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2017).
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IonScan machine. The jury returned a guilty verdict for everyone on the
RASPUTIN on all charges. 46
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the defendants' challenged the
Coast Guard officer's qualifications to testify on the swipe analysis on the
grounds that he had no background in science and his work had never
been peer reviewed. 47 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government's expert,
Senior Chief Petty Officer Gustavo Tirado, to present evidence from the
IonScan machine, which indicated the presence of cocaine from swipes
taken from the defendants' fishing boat. 48 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
Tirado qualified as an expert. 49 The Eleventh Circuit based its findings
on the fact that Tirado had received extensive training on operating the
machine and in interpreting lonScan test results and had operated the
machine hundreds of times in past.5 0 Thus, "any quarrels with his

qualifications were fodder for cross-examination rather than reason to
exclude his testimony altogether."5 1

A. The Confrontation Clause

'

III. CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES

The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause 52 guarantees the
defendant's right to conduct a cross-examination that is effective enough
to (1) expose the jury "to facts sufficient for it to draw inferences relating
to the reliability of th[e] witness," and (2) enable the defendant "to make
a record from which he could argue why the witness might have been
biased." 53 That right is not absolute; instead, it is subject to the trial
court's reasonable limitations on the scope of cross-examination "based
on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion
of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only
marginally relevant." 54 To balance these concerns with the defendant's
right to an effective cross-examination, courts should consider "whether

46. Id. at 1333-37.
47. Id. at 1339-40.
48. Id. at 1335, 1338-40.
49. Id. at 1340.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. U.S CONsT. amend. VI.
53. United States v. Rushin, 844 F.3d 933, 938 (11th Cir. 2016).
54. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (quotations
omitted)).
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a reasonable jury would have received a significantly different
impression of a witness' credibility had counsel pursued the proposed line
of cross-examination."55
Two interesting cases during the 2017 term addressed the interplay
between the defendant's right to an effective cross-examination on the
one hand and the trial court's authority to control the scope of
56
cross-examination on the other hand. In United States v. Jeri, a jury
convicted the defendant of importing a controlled substance and
57
possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
In October 2015, the defendant arrived at Miami International Airport
on a flight from Lima, Peru, with 7.95 kilograms of cocaine secreted in
several items in his luggage. After being detained at customs, the
defendant was read his Miranda rights and agreed to speak to the
authorities. The defendant claimed that a woman named "Fancy Lopez,"
a travel agency owner, offered him cheap flights to Peru in exchange for
carrying luggage for her. The crux of the trial involved determining
whether the defendant knew there was cocaine in the luggage he
transported. During his trial, the defendant was limited to
cross-examining two government witnesses: Officer Laucerica and Agent
Escobar.5 8
The defendant challenged the trial court's limitations of his cross and
re-cross-examination of the witnesses. First, the defendant challenged
the limitation of Officer Laucerica's cross-examination. The court's
limitation excluded any suggestion of hearsay regarding the defendant's
description of his relationship with the person that actually bought his
ticket.59 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that this was probably not error
and even if it was considered error "would not only have been harmless
[error] but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."60 The Eleventh Circuit
went on to explain that this type of testimony "had already come into
evidence and was repeated later in the trial."6 1 The defendant next
attacked the cross-examination and denial of re-cross on Agent Escobar.
Second, the defendant contended that the trial court's limitations during
Escobar's cross-examination were in violation of the Confrontation
Clause. 62 The Eleventh Circuit again concluded that the testimony was

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1469 (11th Cir. 1994).
869 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1254.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1262-63.
Id. at 1263.
Id.
Id.
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already elicited during the trial and to the extent the trial court erred
"any error would be harmless."6 3

The defendant also challenged the denial of his attempts to re-cross
Agent Escobar regarding whether Agent Escobar had ever encountered
a smuggler that had been coached on the back story.64 The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that there was no abuse of discretion to deny re-cross
because the defendant had opened the door when he relied on the fact
that he had been "duped" by the woman that arranged his flight to
Miami. The court affirmed his conviction.65
In United States v. Grace,66 an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh
Circuit dealt with the court's limiting of cross-examination related to
police procedure.6 7 In Grace, the defendant was convicted of robbery and
brandishing a gun in furtherance of a crime of violence. On June 21, 2015,
the victim, a pizza delivery driver for a national pizza chain restaurant,
entered an apartment complex to deliver an order. Two men approached
the victim, assaulted and robbed him (and the pizza restaurant) of over
$700. After the defendant was identified and arrested, the victim was
then shown a photo lineup of the defendant's photo alongside the other
"filler" photographs. The victim then identified the defendant from the
photo lineup. 68 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court's
refusal to allow his attorney to cross-examine the police detective
conducting the lineup about the department's lineup identification
procedures violated the Confrontation Clause.69 The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that even if the limitation may have violated the Confrontation
Clause, the limitation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus
upheld the trial court's ruling. 70 The Eleventh Circuit explained that "the
probative value of this line of cross-examination is weak" because it
would not necessarily show the victim's identification of the defendant
was unreliable.7 1 Rather, the cross-examination would, at best, "show
that the identification procedure could have been conducted in a more
reliable way." 72 Finally, the court noted that defense counsel was able to

63. Id.
64. Id. at 1264.

65. Id.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Nos. 16-12909, 16-17052, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18651 (11th Cir. Sept. 27, 2017).
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *1-6.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *14.
Id.

72. Id.
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make similar a point through cross-examination by asking the detective
if he could have done the procedure in a different way.7 3

Besides guaranteeing an effective cross-examination, the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause guarantees that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." 74 Interpreting the Clause in Crawford v.
Washington,75 the Supreme Court held that it bars the admission of
"[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial," unless "the
declarant is unavailable" and the defendant "had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine" the declarant. 76 Since Crawford, the courts have tried to
define when an out-of-court statement is "testimonial," and thus,
implicates the Clause. Generally speaking, testimonial statements are
those that a declarant "would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially"; 77 for example, "formal statement[s] to government
officers .. . affidavits, custodial examinations, [and] prior testimony that
the defendant was unable to cross-examine." 78 To determine whether
statements are testimonial, courts often examine whether the "primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."7 9
In an interesting unpublished opinion, United States v. Taylor,s0 the
Eleventh Circuit dealt with an appeal on a conviction for possession with
intent to distribute cocaine. The defendant challenged the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama's admission of a video
clip from a confidential informant that showed the defendant and
confidential informant participating in the alleged controlled drug
purchase outside of a residence. The defendant argued that the unmuted
video clip, taken from a hidden camera the confidential informant was
wearing, was effectively testimonial, was "immune from crossexamination," and therefore in violation of the Confrontation Clause.81
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, citing an opinion from the United States

73. Id. at *14-15.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
75. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
76. Id. at 59 ("Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been
admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine.").
77. Id. at 51.
78. United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal
punctuation marks omitted; alterations in original).
79. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
80. 688 F. App'x 638 (11th Cir. 2017).
81. Id. at 642-43.
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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 82 and concluded that the
unmuted video clip, although arguably "outside the view of law
enforcement overseeing the controlled purchase," was not testimonial.8 3
The Eleventh Circuit went on to explain that even if the video was
somehow considered testimonial, the video "was not offered for its truth,
but only to place the investigation and the footage of [the defendant] in
context." 84
B. The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
More commonly known as the right against self-incrimination, the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides that
"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." 85 During the 2017 term, the Eleventh Circuit, in two

interesting unpublished opinions, discussed the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination in the context of police traffic stops. The first,
United States v. Douglas,8 6 considered pre-Miranda questioning during
a traffic stop.8 7 The second, United States v. Jackson,88 considered
whether a defendant's pre-Miranda statement could be offered at
sentencing.8 9
As portrayed on countless television police dramas, the Miranda
warning informs a suspect under police custody of their Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent. The Miranda warning stems from the
Supreme Court opinion Mirandav. Arizona,9 0 where the Court held that
Fifth Amendment protection requires the prosecution to "demonstrate[]
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination" before using, at trial, a defendant's statements
"stemming from custodial interrogation."9 1 The Supreme Court has also
ruled, "however, that it is constitutionally permissible to use a [suspect's]
post-arrest, but pre-Mirandasilence to impeach a defendant." 92

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See United States v. Wallace, 753 F.3d 671, 674-75 (7th Cir. 2014).
Taylor, 688 F. App'x at 642-43.
Id. at 643.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
688 F. App'x 658 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id.
No. 17-10302, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 23048 (11th Cir. Nov. 16, 2017).
Id. at *5.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 444.
United States v. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1190 (2016).
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In United States v. Douglas,93 an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh
Circuit addressed police questioning of a defendant following a traffic
stop for speeding. 94 On February 1, 2016, the defendant was in the
passenger seat of a car driven by the defendant's ex-girlfriend, along with
her thirteen-year-old son. A police officer pulled the car over for speeding
and walked up to the driver's side of the car. After discovering that the
defendant was out on bond, the officer called for a K-9 unit who detected
the presence of marijuana. The officer placed all three in handcuffs,
which was standard practice for the unit. The officer also recognized the
suspect as an acquaintance from his security work at various local night
clubs. Before reading the defendant his Mirandarights, the officer asked
the defendant whether he had a gun or any "weed" on him. The defendant
responded that he had both on him and that all of it belonged to him. At
that point, the officer read the defendant his Mirandarights and formally
asked where the gun and drugs were. After searching the car, the officers
placed the defendant under arrest.9 5
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the statements made to the
officer both before and after being advised of his Miranda rights. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida made a
ruling from the bench that the statements made before the defendant's
rights were read would be suppressed. The trial court analyzed the intent
of the officers and concluded that they did not intentionally fail to
Mirandize the defendant but were instead making a simple inquiry into
his behavior.96
On appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, the defendant argued that the
district court erred in determining that the officer did not act with the
97
"deliberateness" required to trigger the Seibert exception to Miranda.
Under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Oregon v. Elstad,9 8
the existence of a pre-Mirandastatement does not require a suppression
of a post-warning statement if it was voluntarily made.9 9 However, that
general rule is subject to the exception outlined in Missouri v. Seibert,10 0
where the Supreme Court concluded that it was improper to knowingly
withhold Mirandawarnings in order to secure a full confession and then

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

688 F. App'x 658 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 659-60.
Id. at 659-61.
Id. at 661-62.
Id. at 664; see Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
Id. at 309, 318.
542 U.S. 600 (2004).
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provide full warning and get a defendant to then "re-confess."10 1 This is
otherwise known as the "two-step" or "question first" strategy. 102
The Eleventh Circuit first noted that "this Court has not explicitly
taken a position" on whether it should apply a de novo or clear error
standard of review in its analysis under Seibert.103 The court concluded
that the government would prevail on either standard because the
officer's behavior did not indicate that he "purposely and intentionally
plan[ned] to get an admission" from the defendant, "nor did he purposely
and intentionally withhold Miranda warnings." 104 This was
demonstrated by the officer's testimony that this stop was "abnormal" in
that he had a relationship with the defendant in a "mentoring-type
relationship."1

05

In United States v. Jackson, an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh
Circuit addressed whether a statement made in violation of Miranda
could be offered at a defendant's sentencing.106 On August 22, 2014,
Atlanta police stopped the defendant's car because it did not have tag
lights, the lights that illuminate the license plate. The police officers
approached the car and asked the defendant to roll down the driver's side
window more. The police officers smelled marijuana, and based on the
defendant's movements, in particular the defendant's reaching toward
the floorboard of the car, opened the driver's side door. The officers then
placed the defendant in handcuffs. The police asked the defendant
whether there was anything illegal in the car and the defendant said he
had a gun and something inside a Gucci bag. The defendant also told the
officers he was reaching for his gun because he did not want to go back
to jail. The officers then read the defendant his Miranda rights and
07
afterwards, the defendant said that he sold drugs to support his family.1
A federal grand jury charged the defendant with being a felon in
possession of a gun. Before trial, the defendant attempted to move to
suppress the evidence obtained at the stop for lack of probable cause. In
addition, the defendant argued that the statements made by the
defendant to the officers should be suppressed because it was not clear
whether the statements were made knowingly or voluntarily. The
magistrate judge concluded that the statements and evidence obtained
were admissible and the magistrate judge's report and recommendation

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Douglas, 688 F. App'x at 663 (citing Seibert, 542 U.S. at 605-06).
Id.
Id. at 664.
Id.
Id. at 665.
Jackson, No. 17-10302, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 23048, at *1.
Id. at *1-3.
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was adopted by the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict
finding the defendant guilty. At the sentencing hearing, the government
called on the police officers to offer testimony about the statement made
to police about what the defendant was reaching for in the car. The officer
testified that he asked the defendant, "Hey, man, you were really
reaching for that gun?" To which the defendant responded, "I didn't want
to go back to jail, officer." The defendant was subsequently sentenced to
262 months imprisonment. 108
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred at
sentencing by allowing the testimony from the officer, which was
obtained in violation of Miranda.0 9 First, the court noted that "[w]e have
not specifically addressed whether statements made in violation of
Miranda can be introduced at sentencing. At least two other federal
appellate courts, however, have determined that such statements may be
considered at sentencing if they are voluntary and otherwise reliable." 10
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the trial court did not err in allowing
this testimony.111 Relying on its opinion in United States v. Lynch, 112 the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the statement was made voluntarily and
was reliable because it was apparent from the officer's testimony that the
defendant was not coerced into making the statement.1 13 Thus, the court
did not err in allowing the statements at the sentencing hearing. 114
IV. NON-CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A. CharacterEvidence-BalancingRelevance and Unfair Prejudice
In general, the Federal Rules of Evidence consider all relevant
evidence admissible at trial.115 The Rules define relevant evidence
broadly as any evidence that "has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."116 As always, there
are exceptions to this rule. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 excludes the
admission of relevant evidence where "its probative value is substantially

108. Id. at *3-6.
109. Id. at *10.
110. Id. at *12.
111. Id. at *13.
112. 934 F.2d 1226 (11th Cir. 1991).
113. Jackson, No. 17-10302, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 23048, at *14.
114. Id.
115. FED. R. EVID. 402; see also United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1323 (11th
Cir. 2011).
116. FED. R. EvID. 401.
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outweighed by ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence." 117 When assessing whether the unfair prejudice of evidence
substantially outweighs its relevance, the trial court must find that the
evidence has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." 118
Federal Rule of Evidence 404 addresses a specific type of potentially
prejudicial evidence-character evidence-by prohibiting evidence of a
person's character or character trait to "prove that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait."1 1 9 In
the criminal context, the prohibition on character evidence cuts both
ways: the government is generally prohibited from introducing character
evidence to show the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime,
and the defendant is barred from presenting evidence of good conduct in
an attempt to negate criminal intent.1 20 Similarly, Rule 404 also prohibits
evidence of "prior bad acts" by prohibiting the admission of evidence "of
a crime, wrong, or other act . . . to prove a person's character in order to

show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
the character." 121 Such evidence, however, is admissible for other
purposes, including "proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." 122
In United States v. Nerey,123 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
admissibility of other acts as it related to the specific intent to commit
Medicare fraud.1 24 In Nerey, the defendant, along with several
co-conspirators, took part in committing healthcare fraud on of-home
healthcare agencies. The defendants did so by submitting claims for
patients that did not need treatment, failing to perform work billed to
Medicare, and paying kickbacks to patient recruiters. The defendant
played many roles in the conspiracy, including paying for and receiving
healthcare kickbacks, and knowingly soliciting and receiving kickbacks
in connection with a federal health care program. The defendant also

117. FED. R. EVID. 403; see, e.g., Knight, 856 F.3d at 816 (discussing the inclusion of
criminal-history evidence).
118. FED. R. EVID. 403, Advisory Comm. Note (1972).
119. FED. R. EviD. 404(a)(1).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Brannan, 562 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2008).
121. FED. R. EvID. 404(b)(1).
122. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
123. 877 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 2017).
124. Id. at 967-70.
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created shell companies in an attempt to hide the fraudulently obtained
payments and to pay for fraudulent, forged home health prescriptions. 125
At the end of February 2015, Medicare investigated a doctor involved
in the conspiracy and also audited one of the fraudulently created home
healthcare agencies. Part of the investigation included a phone call with
the defendant and another co-conspirator about whether another party
was a confidential informant. "The two discussed 'breaking [that
person's] head."' In June 2015, the government began arresting
individuals and a trial followed.126

At trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine in an attempt to exclude
the discussion with the co-conspirator. The court denied the motions
because the evidence was "relevant, probative, and inextricably
intertwined with the charged counts." 127
On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was improperly
admitted because it did not satisfy Rule 404(b) or the "inextricably
intertwined" exception.1 28 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
defendant's discussion with the co-conspirator regarding whether a
particular person was a confidential informant and "breaking [that
person's] head" was admissible as other-acts evidence. 129 The Eleventh
Circuit determined that the testimony did not go to prove the defendant's
general character for violence, but instead demonstrated the defendant's
specific intent to engage in the conspiracy. 130 This evidence, the court
concluded, was not offered to suggest actual violence, but only that the
defendant had "strong words" with the co-conspirator.1 31 As a result, the
court affirmed the trial court's ruling.1 32
In United States v. Horner,133 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
admissibility of prior bad acts evidence during their trial for assisting in
preparing fraudulent corporate tax returns and filing false individual tax
returns. 134 In Horner, the defendants, a husband and wife, owned a
towing service that required customers to pay cash for many of its
services. Between 2005 and 2008 the defendants made nearly $1.6
million in cash deposits into various personal accounts. During that

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 963-65.
Id. at 96--67.
Id. at 974-75.
Id. at 975.
Id. at 975-76.
Id.

131. Id. at 976-77.
132. Id. at 977.
133. 853 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2017).
134. Id. at 1204.
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period, the defendants did not declare any of the deposits as taxable
income. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) opened an investigation into
the defendants' tax returns and concluded that they were underreporting
the towing service's income as well as their personal income. 13 5
A grand jury eventually indicted the defendants for assisting in the
preparation of a fraudulent corporate tax return and for filing false
individual income tax returns. Before trial, the defendants attempted to
exclude evidence that they "structured" their cash deposits to avoid bank
reporting requirements. The trial court denied these motions and allowed
the government to provide evidence of "structuring." That allowed the
government to offer evidence that between 2005 and 2008, the
defendants had made 177 separate cash deposits under $10,000 in order
to avoid bank reporting requirements. Eventually, a jury found the
defendants guilty on all of the counts and sentenced them to eighteen
months imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and
restitution. 13 6
On appeal, the defendants challenged the trial court's ruling on
"structuring," conceding that the deposits themselves were admissible,
but the characterization of the deposits violated Rule 404(b) because
unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value, and
because it was extrinsic evidence of an uncharged crime. 137 The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the trial court, concluding that under Rule 404(b), "the
evidence was inextricably intertwined with evidence of the fraudulent
tax returns, because the cash deposits formed the basis of the tax fraud
itself."1 38 In addition, the court determined the "structuring" evidence
was also relevant to an issue other than their character because the
evidence "consciously structured their cash deposits to avoid [bank
reporting requirements] strongly suggested that they knew their actions
were unlawful." 139 The Eleventh Circuit also concluded that the
"structuring" evidence was admissible under Rule 403 because it was
"inextricably intertwined with the tax fraud," the evidence was highly
probative, and the "government mitigated and minimized its prejudicial
nature by not informing the jury that structuring actually constituted a
separate crime or wrong." 140
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